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COMPARISON OF SOLAR AND OTHER INFLUENCES ON LONG-TERM CLIMATE* 
James E. Hansen, Andrew A. Lacis and Reto A. Ruedy 
Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 2880 Broadway, New York, NY 10025 
In this paper I first show examples of climate variability and discuss unforced climate fluctuations, as evidenced in both 
model simulations and observations. I then compare different global climate forcings, a comparison which by itself has 
significant implications. Finally, I discuss a new climate simulation for the 1980s and 1990s which incorporates the principal 
known global climate forcings. The results indicate a likelihood of rapid global warming in the early 1990s. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
I got a little worried yesterday afternoon when I 
started to think about what talk I could give today. 
I had brought a pile of viewgraphs from my office, 
thinking that I would be able to select several to 
make a decent talk - with the idea of comparing 
possible solar-forced climate change with climate 
change due to other forcings, and comparing all of 
these with unforced climate fluctuations. That may 
sound o.k., but when I looked at my viewgraphs, 
they seemed pretty dull to me. 
However, after thinking about them awhile, I 
realized that they lead to a remarkable conclusion, 
one with political and social implications. And, 
surprisingly, the result derives, in part, from the 
little one-tenth of one percent change in the solar 
irradiance measured by Dick Willson, which is 
usually dismissed as of no climatic importance. 
So if you stick it through, you may find the 
conclusion interesting. I can't guarantee that I will 
convince you of the conclusion. But I'm pretty sure 
that it is right. In fact, if you disagree with it, I 
would be happy to make a friendly little wager-one 
which much of the community apparently believes to 
be very improbable, so perhaps it's a good chance for 
you to take my money. 
2. OBSERVED CLIMATE VARIABILITY 
The first viewgraph (Fig. I )  shows temperature 
variations over the past 160,000 years, as inferred 
from isotopes in an ice core from Antarctica. The 
temperature thus refers to this specific region, at the 
level in the atmosphere where the snow formed. 
A smoothed estimate of global temperature over 
the same period is shown in Figure 2. Global 
temperature fluctuates on this time scale by about 5C 
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Fig. 1. Atmospheric C02  and temperature change in the past 
160,000 years as inferred from SovietiFrench Vostok Antarctic ice 
core. Twentieth century data points are based on Keeling's 
measurements. 
between the interglacial periods and the depths of 
the glacial periods. Similar oscillations of global 
temperature have occurred many times over the past 
few million years. 
These glacial to interglacial climate fluctuations 
appear to be related to a certain type of solar 
variation - the seasonal and geographical 
redistribution of insolation caused by changes in the 
Earth's orbital elements (the eccentricity of the orbit, 
the tilt of the spin axis, and the season of periapsis). 
Specifically, a high correlation is found between the 
climate changes and the changes of the Earth orbital 
elements, and thus the latter are called the 
"pacemakers of the ice ages." 
However, the orbital changes by themselves 
cause very little net heating or cooling averaged over 
the year and over the planet. The mechanisms which 
maintain the global temperature can be investigated 
by examining the glacial to interglacial change of the 
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Fig. 2. Smoothed estimate of global temperature change over the past 150,000 years, and a projection assuming continued rapid growth 
of greenhouse gases. 
planetary radiation balance. It turns out that the 
principal factors maintaining the ice age cold were, 
(1) the increased area of ice sheets and snow, which 
reflected sunlight to space, (2) decreased amounts of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide and methane, which re- 
duced the greenhouse effect, and (3) increased 
amounts of aerosols and dust, which also reflected 
sunlight. 
Most likely, these mechanisms were feedbacks, 
that is processes which amplified a tendency for 
climate change driven by the earth orbital elements 
or ~ t h e r  factors. Indeed, although the fluctuations 
appear to be almost synchronous (Fig. l) ,  the carbon 
dioxide change usually lags slightly behind the 
temperature change, as expected for a feedback. 
Figure 3 shows global temperature on the 100 
year time scale, based on the network of 
meteorological stations. There are several issues 
about this record, especially ( I )  whether the station 
coverage is adequate to estimate global trends, and 
(2) whether the station records contain systematic 
biases, such as urban warming. The error due to 
incomplete spatial coverage can be estimated quite 
well from knowledge of spatial and temporal vari- 
ability of temperature and has been shown to be 
reasonably small, as indicated by the error bars 
(Fig. 3). Urban effects on the global temperature 
change have been estimated in several different ways 
and found to be not larger than 0.1-0.2C. 
It is apparent that over the full century there is 
a substantial warming trend. However, within that 
period there are intervals of cooling, most notably 
the cooling trend from about 1940 to 1970. There 
are also year to year fluctuations as large as a few 
tenths of a degree. Within the 1980s the maxima in 
1983 and 1987-88 are associated with major El 
~ i n o s ,  as evidenced by the spatial pattern of the 
warming. 
Note that there is no significant trend of global 
temperature within the 1980s. Recently great 
publicity was given to an apparently surprising 
result: "satellites find no warming in the 1980s." 
This statement was bound to deceive the public, 
because of all the prior publicity about the 1980s 
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Fig. 3. Global temperature change of the past century based on 
measurements at meteorological stations. 
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corresponds to O.SC/century, an error which would 
mask the trend of the past century. This large error 
does not mean that the satellite data are of no value 
for study of long term climate change. On the 
contrary, an improved observing system would 
involve a combination of satellite data, to provide 
nearly global coverage, and a continuation of surface 
and upper air (radiosonde) measurements at meteor- 
ological stations, to provide absolute calibration and 
a continuation of long term records. 
3. UNFORCED CLIMATE FLUCTUATIONS 
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Fig. 4. Global temperature in 100 year run of a climate model with 
no variations of climate forcing. 
being the warmest decade of the century with the 
several warmest years all in the 1980s. In reality, of 
course, there was no contradiction with the previous 
findings; the satellite record was simply too brief to 
be used for studying long term trends. 
Also note that even the investigators' optimistic 
estimate of the satellite error as being O.OOSC/year 
Climate fluctuates without any change of climate 
forcing. The climate fluctuations arise because the 
coupled non-linear equations describing atmospheric 
structure and motion are unstable to small 
perturbations. In effect, the atmosphere and ocean 
do a lot of sloshing around. Some of the sloshing, 
for example, the El Nino/Southern Oscillation 
phenomena, may be predictable on a limited time 
scale, but most of it is of a chaotic nature for which 
long term prediction is only possible in a statistical 
sense. 
Unforced climate variability can be studied to a 
degree with global climate models, even if the ocean 
dynamics is fixed. Figure 4 shows the global mean 
temperature simulated in a 100 year run of our GCM 
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Fig. 5. Global temperature in a long run of a climate model (see Endnote 1) with no variations of climate forcing. 
Year 
Fig. 6. Atmospheric C 0 2  concentration based on ice core data (triangles and squares) and data from Mauna Loa (crosses). 
with the solar irradiance and atmospheric composi- 
tion (except water vapor) fixed, but with ocean 
temperature computed. Several fast feedback 
processes, such as atmospheric water vapor amount, 
cloud cover, and sea ice distribution were free to 
vary, but the solar irradiance, atmospheric C 0 2  and 
other trace gases, and ice sheet area were fixed. The 
global mean temperature in this 100 year control run, 
without climate forcings, varied by as much as 
several tenths of a degree Celsius, with fluctuations 
from year to year as well as trends over periods of 
decades. 
We have also made a longer control run, without 
any change of climate forcings, with a slightly 
modified version of our GCM (see Note 1). The 
global mean temperature in this longer run (Fig. 5) 
has year to year and decadal variations, as in the 100 
year run (note that the compressed horizontal scale in 
Fig. 5 makes the variations appear steeper), but it 
also shows trends on longer time scales, such as the 
cooling from year 100 to year 250. 
It's instructive to consider how these unforced 
climate fluctuations would differ if we allowed 
additional feedbacks to operate, particularly 
feedbacks which are expected to be significant on 
paleoclimate time scales. Empirical data indicate 
that on long time scales ice sheet area tends to 
decrease with increasing global temperature, and the 
abundance of the greenhouse gases C02  and CH, 
tends to increase with increasing global temperature, 
so both mechanisms are probably positive feedbacks 
on paleoclimate time scales. Changes of vegetation 
cover and atmospheric aerosol amount are more 
variable, and do not appear to have as large a global 
impact. Overall, it appears that long time scale 
feedbacks could make unforced climate fluctuations 
even much larger than those in Figs. 4 and 5. It is 
difficult to model the variations of these factors, 
because we do not understand the mechanisms well 
enough. But it is likely that unforced climate fluc- 
tuations are quite large on paleoclimate time scales. 
Unforced climate fluctuations complicate the 
search for any forced climate change such as may 
arise from changes of solar irradiance and 
anthropogenic greenhouse gases. Changes of ice 
sheet area can be ignored on decadal time scales, and 
changes of C 0 2  and CH4, although they may be in 
part a result of climate feedbacks, are known 
accurately from observations. But one variable 
ignored in our climate simulations, fluctuations of 
ocean heat transports, is clearly a significant 
contributor to global temperature fluctuations. 
For example, in the record of observed global 
temperature for the past century (Fig. 3) the two 
major El Nifios of the past decade show up as rela- 
tive maxima in 1983 and 1987-88. Ocean transport 
variability also probably contributes to some of the 
longer time scale variability in this global 
temperature record, but we have no proof of that. 
The standard deviation of global annual mean 
temperature in our GCM without forcing and with 
fixed ocean heat transports is about 0.1C. As 
expected, the standard deviation for the observations 
is larger, being about 0.15C even if the long term 
trend in the data is removed. At least in part, the dimensional) climate model for the indicated changes 
larger variability in the observations is probably due of these gases. The increase of greenhouse forcing 
to interannual fluctuations in ocean transports. between 1850 and the present is more than 2 w/m2 
(Fig. 7). The uncertainty in the radiation 
calculations is perhaps 10-20%. The uncertainty due 
4. CLIMATE FORCINGS to other, unmeasured greenhouse gases, particularly 
upper tropospheric ozone (which could cause either 
A climate forcing, natural or anthropogenic, is a a heating or cooling) or stratospheric water vapor 
. change imposed on the climate system which mod- (which is suspected of increasing due to oxidation of 
ifies the planetary radiation balance, thus affecting increasing methane), is perhaps another 10-20%. We 
the planetary temperature. The natural forcings conclude that there has been a steady increase in the 
which appear to most significant, based on system- anthropogenic greenhouse gas climate forcing, which 
atic comparison of radiative effects, are changes of has now reached a level of about 2-2.5 w/m2. 
stratospheric aerosols due to large volcanoes and Unfortunately, the anthropogenic aerosol forcing 
changes of solar irradiance. The largest anthro- is much more uncertain, and its present trend is 
pogenic forcings appear to be increasing infrared- unknown. Perhaps as much as 25-50% of present 
absorbing (greenhouse) gases, man-made tropo- tropospheric aerosols are anthropogenic, which 
spheric aerosols, and perhaps changes of surface would be a global climate forcing between -0.5 
reflectivity due to desertification and deforestation. w/m2 and -1 w/m2, i.e., a cooling which would 
Most of the greenhouse gas changes are known balance a significant fraction of the greenhouse 
rather well. For example, the CO, changes over the warming. Moreover, these aerosols are believed to 
past 250 years are shown in Fig. 6 .  Changes of the increase cloud reflectivity, causing further, but very 
other major greenhouse forcings, chlorofluoro- uncertain, negative climate forcing. But aerosol 
carbons, methane, and nitrous oxide, are known observations are too sparse to define the net aerosol 
reasonably well also. climate forcing. Based on the fact that most 
The net climate forcing by CO,, CFCs, C H I  and anthropogenic aerosols are in the Northern 
N,O for the period from 1958 (the International Hemisphere and observations show comparable 
Geophysical Year, when Keeling began his measure- warming trends in both hemispheres over the past 
ments) to the present is more than 1 w/m2 (Fig. 7). century, it has been argued that the net aerosol 
This is the rate of heating of the Earth's troposphere forcing must be significantly less than the 
as computed with a simple (one-dimensional greenhouse forcing. But clearly we need better 
radiative-convective) or a more sophisticated (three- global tropospheric aerosol measurements. 
Other important climate forcings include changes 
of stratospheric aerosols and solar irradiance, as 
illustrated in Fig. 8 for much of the past decade. A 
solar irradiance change of 0.1% yields a climate 
forcing equivalent to about a 15 ppm CO, change, 
while at its maximum the global climate forcing of 
El Chichon aerosols was equivalent to a more than 
100 ppm CO, change. Of course greenhouse, aerosol 
and solar forcings of equal global magnitude would 
not yield identical climate changes. But tests with 
our GCM using equivalent forcings, namely 2% solar 
constant change, doubled CO,, and a change of 
stratospheric aerosol optical depth of 0.15, yielded 
generally similar global climate changes (with added 
aerosols causing cooling). Although climate 
sensitivity is uncertain by perhaps a factor of three, 
this uncertainty applies equally to all of the forcings. 
Solar and greenhouse forcings during their 
periods of precise monitoring are contrasted in 
Fig. 9. Over the common period of accurate solar 
and greenhouse data the changing sun significantly 
Fig. 7. Added greenhouse climate forcings for the periods modulates the net climate forcing, but it does not 
1850-1957 and 1958-1989. alter the overall trend. *[The upper two solar curves 
in Fig. 9 use the annual mean and monthly mean of 
the present official results of the Nimbus 7 ERB, as 
available from the National Space Science Data 
Center and described by Hickey et al., Space Sci. 
Rev., 48, 321, 1988. The lower curve is an alternate 
preliminary reduction of the Nimbus 7 data which 
includes some modifications aimed chiefly at 
correcting for variations in telescope pointing, as 
described by D.V. Hoyt and H.L. Kyle (private 
communication) in a manuscript which will be 
submitted for publication. Uncertainties in data 
reduction and calibration, as well as significant 
differences between Nimbus 7, SMM and ERBE 
solar irradiance data, highlight the difficulty in 
achieving the high accuracy needed for climate 
studies. Adequate monitoring of long term solar 
change requires having two well-calibrated radio- 
meters in space simultaneously with frequent solar 
observations, as discussed below. Observing capabil- 
ity during the period 1978-1989 was sufficient to 
conclude with a high degree of confidence that there 
was a decline of total solar irradiance of the order of 
0.1% during the first several years of this period and 
at least a partial recovery in the late 1980s.I 
Stratospheric aerosol and greenhouse forcings are 
contrasted in Fig. 10. The aerosol forcing is based 
mainly on estimates of atmospheric transparency 
obtained at astronomical observatories. This 
stratospheric aerosol forcing, which is mostly a result 
of volcanic eruptions, at times rivals or exceeds the 
greenhouse forcing, but the latter clearly dominates 
the long term trend. 
Comparison of climate forcings, as in Figures 9 
and 10, exaggerates the importance of high 
frequency variability. Because of the inertia of the 
climate system, brief forcings have much less impact 
than those maintained for several decades. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that both solar and 
volcanic aerosol variations potentially are significant 
causes of climate variability. 
Ground-based measurements of solar irradiance 
and solar diameter during the past 200 years have 
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Fig. 8. Stratospheric aerosol optical depth measured by the SAM I1 instrument and solar irradiance measured by the ERB instrument on 
the Nimbus 7 spacecraft (SAM I1 data from P. McCormick; ERB data from J.  Hickey, B. Alton, H.L. Kyle and D. Hoyt, as described in 
Space Science Reviews, 48, 321-342, 1988). 
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Fig. 9. Greenhouse and solar climate forcings in the past three 
decades. Solar forcing is based on Nimbus 7 ERB data (see 
parenthetical comment* in text). 
placed an upper limit of about 0.3% on solar 
variability during that period. However, that degree 
of variation is sufficient to leave the sun as a 
candidate for causing the 1940- 1970 global cooling, 
if indeed that was a forced climate change. 
Moreover, a solar decline of 0.3%, if maintained on 
a century time scale, would cause a cooling of about 
0.5C, if climate sensitivity is 3-4C for doubled CO,. 
Since 0.5C is about the magnitude of estimated 
global cooling during the Little Ice Age, the sun is a 
viable candidate for forcing that climate fluctuation. 
We conclude that solar variability may be a 
significant climate forcing mechanism, so it is 
important to maintain accurate solar monitoring. 
Unfortunately, the most precise solar irradiance data 
terminated as the Solar Maximum Mission was 
brought down by atmospheric drag in 1989. Hope- 
fully the solar instruments on Nimbus 7 and the 
Earth Radiation Budget satellites will continue to 
function until the planned 1991 launch of the Upper 
Atmospheric Research Satellite, with its active cavity 
radiometer. The Nimbus 7 instrument has been a 
remarkable workhorse over more than 11 years, but 
it can not measure long term degradation of its 
sensor. The SMM experiment carried three sensors 
with two of them normally shuttered, thus allowing 
occasional calibration of solar-induced degradation 
of the sensitivity of the primary sensor. A 
degradation of 0.05% was measured over the 9) year 
lifetime of SMM, and this instrument's self- 
calibrated irradiance was useful for comparison with 
the simultaneously operating Nimbus 7 instrument. 
The ERBE instruments presently provide a cross- 
check on Nimbus 7, but their data have a higher 
noise level because of a low frequency of solar 
viewing and other factors. We need to strive to have 
two well-calibrated instruments simultaneously in 
orbit, to provide a cross-check and continuity of 
calibration when an instrument ceases operation. 
Finally, I mention one other conclusion which 
follows from comparison of the above. climate 
forcings. The opinion has been expressed, in a 
report of the Marshall Institute, that greenhouse 
warming may be beneficial because it might just 
cancel cooling in the 21st century due to a declining 
solar irradiance. But it is apparent that the 
equivalent of doubled CO,, which is expected by the 
middle of next century if there are no reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions, would require that solar 
irradiance decline by 2% to counter the greenhouse 
climate forcing. While such a solar decline is not 
strictly impossible, it is much larger than existing 
indications of solar variability. Given available 
scientific evidence, it would be foolish to base 
greenhouse policy on the hope that solar variability 
will somehow counter greenhouse warming. 
5. CLIMATE SIMULATION 
We carried out one new climate simulation for 
this conference. This calculation focused on the past 
decade and the next few years, for the purpose of 
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Fig. 10. Greenhouse and stratospheric aerosol climate forcings in 
the past century. Aerosol optical depth is based mainly on atmo- 
spheric transmission measurements a t  astronomical observatories 
and lunar eclipses. Zero point of aerosol forcing is the 1850-1989 
mean. 
examining the climate implications of recent 
information on changes of solar irradiance and other 
climate forcings during the 1980s. The new calcula- 
tion builds on a base of earlier calculations 
(J. Geophys. Res. 93, 9341, 1988) and uses the same 
climate model. The previous simulations used a 
range of scenarios for greenhouse gas changes (A, B 
and C) and a rough estimate of stratospheric aerosol 
optical depth following El Chichon, which erupted 
less than a year before the simulation was started. 
Greenhouse gases and stratospheric aerosols were the 
only changing climate forcings in the earlier 
simulations. 
The greenhouse gas forcing in the new 
simulation, labeled B,, is based on our recent 
calculation (J. Geophys. Res. 94, 16417, 1989) of the 
combined forcing by C02, CFCs, CH, and N20, and 
is almost identical to scenario B of the previous 
study. Both B and Bn assume linear growth of 
greenhouse forcing in the future, as opposed to the 
exponential growth of scenario A ("business as 
usualn) and the eventual no-growth of scenario C 
("draconian emission cutsn). Scenarios B and Bn 
appear to be more realistic than scenarios A and C 
for recent and near future changes of greenhouse 
gases. 
The solar irradiance was constant in scenario B, 
i.e., there was no solar forcing. In scenario Bn we 
used an analytic approximation for satellite 
measurements of solar irradiance as suggested to us 
by Dick Willson: a cosine function with full 
amplitude 0.1%, period 10.95 years, and maximum at 
1980.82. Good data through the present solar 
maximum may allow an improved representation, but 
this approximation should be sufficient for our 
present purposes. 
The stratospheric aerosols in scenario B are 
described in our 1988 paper. Scenario Bn uses 
aerosol opacities derived from approximately annual 
lunar eclipse data of Richard Keen (Sciertce. 222, 
1011, 1983 and private communication). The B, 
aerosols have a larger maximum optical depth (0.12) 
than the B aerosols and do not decrease quite as 
rapidly, so the Bn aerosols tend to give somewhat 
more cooling in the middle 1980s. For aerosols, we 
are not certain whether B or Bn is more accurate. 
Presently we are working with Jim Pollack and Pat 
McCormick to use a number of data sources to try to 
define the aerosol forcing more precisely. The net 
impact of the changes of climate forcing in B,, as 
compared to B, is a slightly increased forcing around 
1980, a decrease in the middle 1980s, and an increase 
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Fig. 11. Global temperatures for three new runs (B,) of model I1 compared to previously published scenario B. 
at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
One point we want to stress is the "butterfly 
effect." If a climate model simulation is repeated, 
with identical climate forcing but with some initial 
atmospheric parameter (temperature, wind, etc.) 
changed ever so slightly (a flap of a butterfly's wings 
in Buenos Aires), the simulations follow different 
chaotic paths. Thus we must make several runs of 
the model, if we wish to draw any conclusions about 
climate change on time scales of several years. 
We illustrate the global temperature for three 
new runs of the model (B,, B1 and B,) in Figure 11, 
along with the published run, scenario B. The B1 
and B2 runs begin on January 1, 1958 with the same 
initial conditions as run B except for a slight noise 
added to atmospheric temperatures. Since the 
forcings for B and B, are almost identical for the 
period 1958-1978, the results for B, B, and B, in 
that 20 year period give an indication of the range 
of chaotic behavior of the model. Run Bo starts in 
1978 and uses B, climate forcing (its initial state is 
identical to run B on January 1, 1978). 
Note that all the simulations show some response 
(cooling) to the large short-term negative climate 
forcings caused by the large volcanoes in 1963 
(Agung) and 1982 (El Chichon). Of course the 
model does not contain the variability associated 
with fluctuations in ocean heat transports, such as El 
Niios. Thus, although the real world (Fig. 3) shows 
clear evidence of cooling after Agung, apparent 
cooling in the 1982-1985 time frame is interrupted 
by an intense El ~ i n o  warming in 1983. 
The dominant feature of the new simulations 
(runs Bo, B1 and Bf) is the very strong warming in 
the late 1980s to a level in the early 1990s clearly 
above any earlier global temperature. The 
magnitude of the warming exceeds the noise level of 
the model. The principal change in scenarios B,, as 
compared to B, is a pushing back of the warming by 
about 2 years to the end of the 1980s. However, 
both B and B, reach very high global temperatures, 
about 0.4C above the level of the 1950s, in the early 
1990s. 
What assumptions does this result depend upon? 
First, model sensitivity: our model has a sensitivity 
4C for doubled CO,. Any sensitivity in the range 2 
to 5C is consistent with empirical data, such as that 
provided by paleoclimate studies. A sensitivity 
toward the lower end of this range would reduce the 
predicted warming, but not by so much as the ratio 
of sensitivities. Calculations should be carried out 
with a lower sensitivity, but we do not expect the 
qualitative prediction to change. Secorrd, neglect of 
other unknown forcings: there are a number of 
poorly known forcings, such as anthropogenic 
tropospheric aerosols, sulfate alterations of cloud 
properties, and aircraft contrails, for example. But 
the evidence, as we have discussed, suggests that the 
anthropogenic greenhouse is the dominant forcing. 
A large volcano could change this picture, but their 
frequency, several per century, makes an occurrence 
unlikely in the next year or two. Third, neglect of 
unforced natural cooling. Actually our "butterflyn 
range of experiments accounts for much unforced 
variability. The El Ni io  cycle is probably the main 
unaccounted unforced variability, and the Earth has 
just come through the cool (La ~ i i a )  phase of that 
cycle, so, if anything, the El ~ i i o  is likely to add to 
warming in the next 1-3 years. The possibility of a 
sudden "flipn of ocean circulation, as discussed by 
Broecker, seems slim on the time frame of the next 
1-3 years, and there is little reason to believe such an 
occurrence would lower global mean temperature. 
6. DISCUSSION 
My conclusion is that we are likely to set a 
modern global temperature record in the next 1-3 
years, measurably exceeding the already high levels 
of the 1980s. I described this, in the introduction, as 
a remarkable conclusion because it is even more 
immediate and specific than our previous conclusion 
that the 1990s would see a record temperature level. 
And other scientists, although most are in agreement 
that the greenhouse effect will eventually cause 
global warming, have been unwilling to conclude 
even that we should expect record warmth in the 
1990s. This reluctance is usually based on the 
observation that natural fluctuations are large in 
decadal periods, and the fluctuations are toward 
cooling as often as toward warming. What is 
overlooked, I believe, is the fact that the present 
climate is out of equilibrium with current 
atmospheric composition. Because of that, it is 
difficult for global temperature to maintain a large 
"fluctuationn in the direction of lower temperature. 
Indeed, that point is illustrated by our "butterflyn 
experiments. And even if we insert a volcano of El 
Chichon magnitude in 1995, as we did in our 1988 
paper, the 1990s are warmer than the 1980s in the 
model. 
Are there political and social implications to be 
drawn from this conclusion, without stretching it too 
far? The results suggest that a candidate for election 
in 1992 may be making a serious mistake if he argues 
that this is a time only for research and not to take 
action to slow emissions - because there is a very 
good chance that he would get burned before the 
1992 election, burned by empirical evidence of a 
warming world. To be burned badly would require 
some large regional climate impacts as well, but the 
chance of that happening will rise with increasing 
global temperature. A social implication follows 
from the observation that serous attempts to control 
greenhouse gas emissions will be strongly resisted, 
and thus hypothetical climate change next century is 
unlikely to spur much action. So clear-cut global 
warming in the next 1-3 years could provide a push 
needed to help move us toward the changes which 
will be required to bring down greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
That brings me to my friendly wager. The 
conclusion about expected near term warming is 
based on simulations with a global climate model - 
the tool which has been thoroughly condemned as 
being unreliable - condemned by many scientists as 
well as bureaucrats. Also the statement I have made, 
that the world is getting warmer and that it is 
probably due to the greenhouse effect, has been 
widely criticized as being unjustified. If those 
criticisms are really believed, then surely someone 
would be willing to accept the following wager: 
I claim that at least one year in the period 
1990-1992 will be warmer than any year in the prev- 
ious century. I win only if it is true in all of the 
main long term data sets: the GISS analysis of mete- 
orological stations, the East Anglia analysis including 
ships, and Angell's upper air (radiosonde) data set. 
I get three years and you get 100 years. Someone 
mentioned that there will probably be an El Niho in 
the period 1990-1992. That may be so, but there 
were probably 20 or 30 El ~ i h o s  in the previous 
century, including two very intense El Nihos in the 
1980s, which was the warmest decade. So there 
should be plenty of souls willing to make this wager. 
The offer remains open, so please contact me. 
Can we Iearn anything about long term climate 
from temperature and other data for just the next 
three years? I think we can. If nature cooperates by 
holding off any large volcanoes, and if there is 
significant global warming consistent with the model 
calculations, it will improve our confidence in our 
understanding of the climate system's response to a 
sustained global forcing. On the other hand, if there 
is no warming or a cooling, it will suggest that we 
have overestimated climate sensitivity, overlooked 
other important climate forcings, or underestimated 
fluctuations in ocean transports. 
ENDNOTES 
1,  Wottderland Model 
The climate model used for the several hundred 
year simulation (Fig. 5) is a modification of the GISS 
model 11. The physics is the same as in model 11, 
except that the fundamental equations include a 
more accurate representation of the impact of water 
vapor on surface pressure and atmospheric thermo- 
dynamic properties, for the purpose of allowing 
simulations over a greater range of climate states. 
The primary difference compared to model I1 is the 
geography (Fig. 12), which, borrowing from an idea 
of Suki Manabe, covers only 120 degrees of longi- 
tude in the wonderland model, with cyclic repetition 
to fill out spherical geometry. The amount of land as 
a function of latitude is the same as in the real 
world, and the zonal mean climate simulated by the 
wonderland model is almost the same as for model 11. 
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Fig. 12. Wonderland climate model. 
The main advantage of the wonderland model is 
that it is three times faster than model 11, thus 
allowing long simulations to be carried out on a 
computer of modest capabilities. A secondary 
advantage is the fictitious geography, which 
emphasizes the fact that the model is not the real 
world, thus helping the user focus on the climate 
processes simulated by the model. 
2. Ratioizale for a wager 
It has been pointed out to me that proposing a 
wager, especially since it was reported in a scientific 
journal (Scierrce May 4, 1990), appears to be a bit 
unprofessional. On the other hand, it can be argued 
that it is worthwhile to draw attention to the issue of 
whether climate change during just the next few years 
has implications for longer term climate change. 
However, the original rationale for the wager had 
a slightly different purpose. I concocted the 
proposed bet before the AGU meeting last 
December, under the impression that I would be in 
a panel discussion with Dick Lindzen. He has left 
the impression with the public that he disagrees with 
my assertion that the world is getting warmer and 
that the warming is probably due to the greenhouse 
effect; also, he argues that climate sensitivity is much 
less than indicated by the models and that the 
anthropogenic greenhouse warming may be small 
compared to natural variability. It seemed to me that 
given his position, he had to either accept the bet or 
do a fancy shindig which would undermine the 
extreme view credited to him. As it turned out, 
there was no panel discussion following our talks, so 
I had to save the proposition for the next conference. 
I had hoped that Bob Jastrow would bite on it, but 
he demurred on the grounds that the sun is 
increasingly warming the earth! That is interesting, 
since he has long argued that the Earth is already 
heading into an ice age. Also, the satellite data do 
not indicate a greater irradiance this solar cycle than 
in the previous one. 
Wagers aside, it is interesting to look at data for 
the first few months of 1990. Preliminary numbers 
from our (Hansen and Lebedeff) analysis of surface 
air reports from meteorological stations show 
anomalies (relative to 1951- 1980) of t0.5, t0.4, t1.5, 
+0.9C for the Northern Hemisphere and +0.1, -0.2, 
t0.2, +0.2C for the Southern Hemisphere for the first 
four months of 1990. The March anomaly is the 
largest for any month in our record, and, if the mean 
for the first four months held for the next eight 
months, 1990 would be the warmest year in our 
record. However, the largest anomalies almost 
always occur in Northern Hemisphere winter and 
early spring, and throughout the warm decade of the 
1980s the first half of the year was considerably 
warmer than the second half. Thus, for 1990 to rank 
as the warmest year will require that the remaining 
months be substantially warmer than they were in 
the 1980s. 
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